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If l: is any standard formal system adequate for recursive number theory, a formula (having a certain integer q as its G6del number) can be constructed which expresses the proposition that the formula with Gbdel number q is provable in S. Is this formula provable or independent in F, ? [2] .
One approach to this problem is discussed by Kreisel in [4] . However, he still leaves open the question whether the formula (Ex) iB(x, a), with Gbdelnumber a, is provable or not. Here 58(x, y) is the number-theoretic predicate which expresses the proposition that x is the number of a formal proof of the formula with G6del-number y.
In this note we present a solution of the previous problem with respect to the system Zo [3] pp. 289-294, and, more generally, with respect to any system whose set of theorems is closed under the rules of inference of the first order predicate calculus, and satisfies the subsequent five conditions, and in which the function B(k, 1) used below is definable.
The notation and terminology is in the main that of [3] pp. 306-326, viz. if W is a formula of Z,, containing no free variables, whose G6del number is a, then ({I}) stands for (Ex) 56(x, a) (read: the formula with Gbdel number a is provable in Z,,); if W is a formula of Zo containing a free variable, y say, t({?}) stands for (Ex)93(x, g(y)), where g(y) is a recursive function such that for an arbitrary numeral n the value of g(n) is the G6del number of the formula obtained from W by substituting n for y in W throughout. We shall, however, depart trivially from [3] in writing 0(n), where n is an arbitrary numeral, for (Ex)93(x, n).
In [3] (loc. cit.) the following four conditions are shown to be satisfied by the predicate e8 (m, n) of Z4,. III. If /(x) is a recursive term, then the formula
is a theorem. IV. If the formula ? is provable, so is the formula 9({3}). In addition, we require the following condition.
V. For any formula A, the formula
is a theorem. Proof of V. From the axiom-schema
and II we see that
and hence by the predicate calculus
are formal theorems. Replacing A (x) by 1(x)=0, where /(x) is a recursive term, we obtain the theorem
From III we prove by the predicate calculus the formula and thence, in conjunction with (a), obtain the theorem
Since, moreover, the formula t({W}) (i.e. (Ex)9(x, a), where a is the Gbdel number of St) is of the form (Ex)(f(x) =0), V follows.
THEOREM.2 If S is any formnla such that 9 -({ +) X is a theorem, then e is a theorem.
COROLLARY. The particular formula S of Henkin's problem, which is the same as ({a}), is a theorem.
Proof. Let S be a formula such that G({}) -is a theorem.
(i) Let B(k, 1) be the function such that, if f is the G6del number of an expression St, the value of B(f, I) is the G6del number of the expression obtained from A by replacing the variable a throughout by I.
By means of the function B(k, 1) we can construct3 a formula St which has the form For consider the formula 9 (B(a, a) ) -? S. Let its Gbdel number be f. Then the formula 0(J(f, f)) -C S has the Gddel number @(f, f). So if i is the formula with Gbdel number F, f), then Z has the form -({'}) -.
(ii) If i is a theorem, so is S. For if i is a theorem, so is -({X}) according to IV, and then e is obtained simply by modus ponens.
(iii) The argument of (ii) may be formalized to obtain a formal proof of the formula (iv) Now we make use of our hypothesis that S ({e}) -;
is a theorem, combining it with (e) to obtain the information that is a theorem, i.e. S is a theorem by (i).
(v) Since ? is provable (iv), we use (ii) to conclude that e is a theorem. This completes the proof.
The method used in the previous proof leads to a new derivation of paradoxes in natural language.4 For let A be any sentence, and let B be the sentence "If this sentence is true, then so is A."
Now we easily see that, if B is true, then so is A. That is, B is true. Hence, A is-true. WN'e have thus shown that every sentence is true.
It is worth noticing, perhaps, that this paradox is derived without using the word "not".4 It is therefore available as a test of inconsistency of formal systems which do not contain a symbol for negation.
